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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This appeal is from a final order of the district court
granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
was

originally

filed

in

the

Utah

Supreme

This appeal

Court

which

has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j),
U.C.A.

The Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of

Appeals, pursuant to section 78-2-2(4), U.C.A.

The Court of

Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to section
78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the district court err in substituting its judgment

for that of the board of county commissioners in reversing the
board's determination that the plaintiff's bid proposal was nonresponsive to the County's invitation for bids?
2.

Did the district court err in failing to view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants and to
resolve any doubt or uncertainty concerning the evidence in the
defendants' favor?
3.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment

in plaintiff's favor under a breach of contract theory?
4.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment

in plaintiff's favor under a negligence theory?
5.

Did the district court err in awarding damages in the

nature of anticipated lost profits?
Standard of review: In considering a summary judgment motion.
1

the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable
inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable
to the party opposing summary judgment.

Conder v. A.L. Williams

& Assocs.. Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987).

The analytical

standard for appellate review of a summary judgment is the same as
that of the trial court: the appellate court reviews the facts and
inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the
losing party.

If the appellate court concludes that a genuine

issue of material fact exists, the summary judgment will be
overturned and the case remanded for further proceedings on that
issue.

Where no material facts remain unresolved, the appellate

court examines the trial court's conclusions of law and reviews
them for correctness.

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941,

946 (Utah App. 1989); English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah
App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND ORDINANCES
The relevant rules and ordinances whose interpretation is
determinative are:
1.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (reproduced in the

addendum to the brief).
2.

The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966 as

amended, section 1-2-9, entitled Contracts

(reproduced in the

addendum to the brief).
3.

The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966 as

amended, section 18-1-1, et seq., entitled Purchasing Procedures
(reproduced in the addendum to the brief).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff
(Wadsworth)

Ralph

L. Wadsworth

Construction

Company, Inc.

this action

in district

court

initiated

seeking

injunctive relief or, alternatively, damages against Salt Lake
County (County).

Wadsworth was one of two construction companies

that submitted bid proposals in response to the County's invitation
for bids for the work of constructing a county flood control
project.

Wadsworth, the unsuccessful bidder, alleged in its

complaint that the County improperly rejected its bid proposal as
non-responsive and awarded the contract to the other bidder, Gerber
Concrete Construction, Inc. (Gerber), in contravention of the terms
and conditions set forth in the Invitation to Bid.

In its answer,

the County denied that its rejection of Wadsworth's bid proposal
as non-responsive was improper or contrary to the Invitation to
Bid.

The County affirmatively alleged, inter alia, that its

decision

to

accept

or

reject

a

bid

for

a

contract

is a

discretionary matter vested by law with the board of county
commissioners and the court should not intervene in the process
unless there is evidence of abuse of discretion, dishonesty, fraud
or collusion in the awarding process, no such allegation being
raised in this case.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

Wadsworth initially sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary

injunction

to

stop

the

County

and

Gerber

from

proceeding with the project (R. 52-55, 29-40). Wadsworth's motion
3

for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was
heard by the district court on September 5, 1985. At the hearing,
Wadsworth requested a "permanent injunction" (R. 176), and the
court initially ruled that it would grant a permanent injunction
against the County (R. 28).

Following the hearing, Wadsworth

submitted a proposed order granting a permanent injunction which
contained findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 86-92). The
County filed an objection to the proposed order, findings, and
conclusions (R. 67-70) together with a memorandum of law (R. 5666) . A hearing was held on the County's objection on September 13,
1985, and the court subsequently reversed its earlier ruling and
entered an Order denying Wadsworth's motion for injunctive relief
(R. 97-98).
Following completion of the construction of the flood control
project by Gerber, the County filed a motion for summary judgment
and supporting memorandum (R. 110-125).

The motion was initially

heard and granted by the court on June 22, 1987 (R. 126-128).
Thereafter, Wadsworth filed a motion for relief from judgment and
rehearing (R. 131-135).

The County's motion for summary judgment

was reheard on June 29, 1987, at which time the court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part (R. 189-190) . The court ruled
that Wadsworth was no longer entitled to seek injunctive relief due
to mootness (the project having been completed) but could continue
to seek monetary damages against the County.
On July 12, 1989, Wadsworth filed a motion for summary
judgment, affidavit, and

supporting memorandum
4

(R.

224-284),

alleging that Wadsworth was entitled to recover damages in the
nature of lost profits under two separate theories, namely:

(1)

"breach of contract to award the project to Wadsworth" and (2)
"negligence in considering and rejecting Wadsworth's bid" (R. 225) .
The County filed a memorandum in opposition to Wadsworth's motion
(R. 331-357), together with six opposing affidavits (R. 289-330)•
On December

14, 1989, the court entered

its order granting

Wadsworth's motion for summary judgment "as prayed." (R. 429-431).
The County filed its notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court on January 12, 1990 (R. 434-435).

On April 24, 1990, the

Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of
Appeals for disposition.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July of 1985, Salt Lake County invited bids for the work
of constructing a flood control project known as the Scott Avenue
Basin on Millcreek at 800 East, by issuing a public Invitation to
Bid to all licensed and qualified construction contractors (R. 23, 209).
Prior to issuing the Invitation to Bid, the County contracted
with

an

independent

consultant, Eckhoff, Watson

and

Preator

Engineering (Consultant), to assist the County in preparing bid
documents, advertising the project for bids, attending the bid
opening, reviewing the tabulation of bids, and advising the County
as to the proper action to be taken regarding the award of the
contract (R. 290-292).
The

County

designated

the
5

bidding

to

be

under

sealed

competitive public bidding and designated the date of July 29,
1985, at 11:30 a.m., as the time when all bids would be opened and
publicly read and an apparent low responsible bidder designated (R.
3, 209).
At the bid opening on July 29, 1985, the County, through its
designated representatives, opened the sealed bids of all bidders
on the project (R. 280) . The bid of each bidder was publicly read,
and Wadsworth was initially designated as the apparent low bidder
(R. 280) .

This was an initial designation and not a final

designation, being contingent upon the acceptance of the bid
proposal and the awarding of the contract by the board of county
commissioners (R. 280, 8 ) .
The Consultant then tabulated and verified the bids received
on the project and on July 30, 1985 provided to the County a copy
of the Bid Tabulation, together with a letter containing the
Consultant's findings and recommendation (R, 290, 293-302).
In tabulating and verifying the bids, the Consultant found
that the bid proposals submitted by both Wadsworth and Gerber
contained minor extension errors (which were corrected by the
Consultant in the Bid Tabulation), and that the apparent low bid
submitted by Wadsworth contained irregularities on the bid form
which made Wadsworth's bid proposal non-responsive to the County's
invitation to bid (R. 293) . In its letter, the Consultant stated:
The bid submitted by Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction
Company is not responsive to the invitation to bid
because it violated the Rules Governing Bids as outlined
in the Instructions to Bidders.
On Schedule D, two
prices were listed for Item 1 Basin Floodwalls and these
two prices were also listed in the subtotal for Schedule
6

D and the Bidding Schedule Summary. Of the two Total Bid
amounts listed, one was the apparent low bid, as stated
above, in the amount of $692,640*48 and the second bid
was the second low bid amount (behind Gerber's bid) in
the amount of 792,140.48, This represents an addition
to the bid form, an alternative proposal, and a
modification of the bid form which was not specifically
called for in the contract documents and may result in
the County's rejection of the bid because it violated the
rules of bidding. (R. 293).
The Consultant made the following recommendation to the
County:
Based upon the irregularity of wadsworth's bid and the
rules governing bidding, we recommend that the County
exercise it"s right to reject it as not being responsive
and that the contract be awarded to Gerber Concrete
Construction. (R. 293).
In the County's Invitation to Bid/ the following rules were
included in the Instructions to Bidders under the Rules Governing
Bids:
1.3.03
Changes in or additions to the bid form,
recapitulations of the work bid upon, alternative
proposals, or any other modification of the bid form
which is not specifically called for in the contract
documents may result in the County's rejection of the bid
as not being responsive to the invitation.... (R. 9).
1.3.04
The Board of County Commissioners reserves the
right to reject any and all proposals, and to waive any
informality in the proposal received. (R. 9 ) .
The Instructions to Bidders, under the heading "Preparation
of Bid," included the following instruction:
1.2.04
On the bidding schedule of the proposal form
the unit prices shall be written in ink or typed both in
words and numerals. In cases of discrepancy the amount
in words shall be construed to be the desired amount.
(R. 8) .
The

County's

Invitation

to Bid contained

the following

statement on the Bidding Schedule Summary page:

"THE AWARD OF

7

CONTRACT, IF MADE, WILL BE TO THE LOWEST RESPONSIVE, RESPONSIBLE
BIDDER, PURSUANT TO COUNTY ORDINANCE." (R. 23).
On July 31, 1985, two days after the bid opening, Wadsworth
sent a letter to Neil Stack, a county employee, which stated: "This
letter

is to

clarify

referenced project."
that Wadsworth

had

some

confusion

concerning

(R. 439, exhibit 2).
inadvertently

our

bid

on

The letter indicated

forgotten

to

erase

certain

penciled-in figures, "thus causing some confusion as to which
number should be used." (R. 439, exhibit 2 ) .
On August 14, 1985, the board of county commissioners held a
public hearing for the purpose of reviewing the bid proposals and
awarding

the

contract

(R.

268-270).

During

the

hearing,

Wadsworth's President, Ralph Wadsworth, stated his objections to
the contract being awarded to Gerber, arguing that the commission
has the right to waive any irregularities in a bid or to rebid the
project (R. 269).
In response, Thomas B. Larson, a deputy county attorney,
stated that although the bidding instructions allow the board to
waive any informality in a bid, the informality must not rise to
the degree that it makes the bid uncertain or ambiguous.

He

further stated that the bid submitted by Wadsworth contained two
different figures in the total price block, one in pencil and one
in ink; that the two total price figures submitted by Wadsworth
straddled the total price figure submitted by Gerber, one high and
one low; and that if there had been no other bidder within the high
to low range of Wadsworth's two figures, then Wadsworth could have
8

argued for the higher pencil price by requesting that the pencil
informality be waived.

He noted that the County has on occasion

waived the ink requirement and the requirement that all prices be
in writing as well as in numbers (R. 307-312).
After having reviewed the relevant bidding documents and
having

considered

the

statements

and

recommendations

of all

interested parties, the board of county commissioners voted to
award the contract to Gerber (R. 313-330).
The board determined that the bid proposal submitted by
Wadsworth was not acceptable for the following reasons:

(1) the

bid proposal form contained multiple entries in several places,
including two different figures in the box for the total bid price,
thus making the bid proposal ambiguous as to the total price; and
(2) the two different figures in the total bid price space in the
Wadsworth bid straddled the total bid price of the Gerber bid, thus
giving the Wadsworth bid a potentially unfair competitive advantage
by allowing Wadsworth to claim either figure as its intended bid
(R. 313-330).
Subsequent to the awarding of the contract to Gerber on August
14, 1985, Wadsworth took no action to protest the award until after
construction on the project had commenced, with the result that
considerable work had been completed by the time Wadsworth's motion
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was
heard by the district court on September 5, 1985 (R. 45, 163).
After this lawsuit was filed, the County took the depositions
of Ralph Wadsworth, Wadsworth's president, and Guy Wadsworth,
9

Wadsworth1s general manager and estimator (R. ^ « and 439).

They

testified that Guy Wadsworth had prepared Wadsworth's bid proposal
(deposition exhibit 1) and had then given it to Ralph Wadsworth to
sign and carry to the bid opening.

Twenty minutes before the bid

opening, Ralph Wadsworth called Guy Wadsworth on the telephone and
told him that he was worried about the bid because he hadn't seen
any other bidders and their bid was approximately $200,000.00 below
the engineer's estimate.

Ralph Wadsworth testified:

The engineer's estimate.
It was something like
$900,000. So, I asked him how the hell come ours was
$692,000, why we were so low.
And he said, That's the way it turned out. He
thought he was all right on them, but maybe he better
have another look at it. So, I told him I would call him
back. He better look and make sure he didn't make any
mistakes.
Then I said, Maybe you better give me a higher
figure to go in here in case I can't get you back or
something. What's the possibility of your error, if you
made an error or something? We discussed that, and we
arrived at $100,000.
And I asked him how many guys were bidding the job.
And he says there was a lot of bidders. And I said,
There are a lot? I haven't seen anybody yet. Is this
job more rough than you think it is? Because we never
had bid a job where there was one or two bidders in the
last five years. It seems like on County jobs, there are
eight or ten bidders.
So, I was worried about it. I was concerned that
since there wasn't a lot of bidders, maybe the job was
a lot more difficult than Guy had thought. And due to
the fact that we were $200,000 under the estimate, he
better look at it.
(R. 438, pp. 10-11). Following their telephone conversation, Ralph
Wadsworth wrote in the higher figures in pencil on the bid proposal
(R. 438, pp. 9-10).

Guy Wadsworth testified:

Q
Were the pencil figures just splitting the
difference between the estimate, the engineer's estimate,
and your figures?
A
Yes. We wanted to put a contingency number in
10

in case I had made a serious mistake. And the idea being
that he would get back to me after I had had a few
minutes to review it. If for some reason he couldn't get
through to me because of lack of an available phone or
whatever reason, we would have to take a chance on being
kicked out because of the bid being too high. But we
wanted to hedge our bets, I guess.
(R. 439, p. 7 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
DETERMINATION OF LOWEST RESPONSIVE, RESPONSIBLE BIDDER.
The board of county commissioners rejected Wadsworth's bid
proposal because the board determined it was non-responsive to the
County's invitation for bids.

In reversing the determination of

the board, the district court failed to apply the correct standard
of judicial review to the board's determination.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
County, the board of county commissioners had a "reasonable basis"
for rejecting Wadsworth's bid proposal as non-responsive to the
County's invitation for bids.

The board's determination was not

arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, and in the
absence of such a finding, the district court erred by improperly
substituting the court's own judgment for that of the board.
LIABILITY UNDER THEORY OF BREACH OF CONTRACT.
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wadsworth's bid
proposal was wrongfully rejected, Wadsworth was still not entitled
to summary judgment under a breach of contract theory.
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that a bid
proposal submitted in response to an invitation for bids for a
public construction contract creates no contractual relationship,
11

either express or implied, between the bidder and the public
entity.
In the present case, applying the rule and test adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court, there was no contract, either express or
implied, entered into between Wadsworth and the County.

Because

there was no contractual relationship, there could be no breach of
contractual duties by the County.
in ruling

that

the

County

Thus, the district court erred

"breached

contractual

duties" in

rejecting Wadsworthfs bid.
LIABILITY UNDER THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE.
The courts have not recognized any cause of action for
"negligent consideration and rejection of bids" in the area of
public

construction

judicial

review

contracts.

for contested

The

appropriate

awards

of public

standard

of

construction

contracts is that the courts will not attempt to control the
discretion of public officials, nor substitute the courts' judgment
for that of the public officials, except upon evidence of abuse of
discretion, fraud, or corruption.

This is true even if the

official's decision appears erroneous or if reasonable persons may
disagree.
In the present case, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment under a theory of negligence for the following
reasons. First, Wadsworth's complaint failed to allege a claim for
negligence. Second, even if it did allege a negligence claim, such
claim has not been recognized by the courts in the area of public
construction contracts. Third, even if such claim were actionable,
12

summary judgment was inappropriate in view of the evidence in the
record which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
County, raises genuine issues as to material facts,
DAMAGES IN THE NATURE OF ANTICIPATED LOST PROFITS,
Wadsworth was not entitled to recover damages in the nature
of lost profits under any applicable theory of liability.

The

judicial remedies available to a wrongfully rejected bidder on a
public construction contract do not include an award of anticipated
lost profits.
policy.

This rule is based upon sound principles of public

Although a few courts have begun to allow unsuccessful

bidders to recover damages in the nature of bid preparation costs
under a theory of implied contract or promissory estoppel, the Utah
Supreme Court specifically rejected this approach in the Rapp case
where it declined to allow the recovery of bid preparation costs
under an implied contract theory.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wadsworth
was entitled to recover damages in the nature of lost profits,
Wadsworth's claimed amount of lost profits lacked proper foundation
and was based upon speculation.

As a result, genuine issues of

material fact existed with regard to the amount, if any, of
Wadsworth!s claimed damages, thus precluding summary judgment.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR
THAT OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS IN REVERSING
THE BOARD'S DETERMINATION THAT WADSWORTH'S BID PROPOSAL
WAS NON-RESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTY'S INVITATION TO BID.
The board of county commissioners determined that Wadsworth's
bid proposal was non-responsive to the county's invitation for bids
because:

(1) it contained multiple entries in several places in

violation of the Rules Governing Bids and was ambiguous as to the
total bid price, and (2) it gave Wadsworth an unfair competitive
advantage over other bidders by allowing Wadsworth to claim either
price as its intended bid.

As a result, the board rejected

Wadsworth's bid proposal and determined that Gerber was the lowest
responsive, responsible bidder.
The district court, in ruling on Wadsworth's motion for
summary judgment, substituted the court's own judgment for that of
the board of county commissioners as to whether or not Wadsworth's
bid was responsive to the County's invitation for bids and ruled
that:

"Plaintiff [Wadsworth] was the low, responsive, responsible

bidder on the project and defendants should have awarded the
project to plaintiff." (R. 424).
A.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO APPLY THE CORRECT
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS' DETERMINATION THAT WADSWORTH'S BID WAS
NON-RESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTY'S INVITATION TO BID.
It has long been established as a rule of law in most
jurisdictions, including Utah, that public bodies are vested with
14

discretion

in deciding

to

accept

or reject

bids

on public

construction projects, and that the courts should not interfere
with the decision of the public body, nor substitute the court's
judgment for that of the public body, unless there is evidence of
abuse of discretion, dishonesty, fraud, or collusion

in the

awarding process. The appropriate standard of judicial review for
a contested award of a public construction contract has been stated
as follows:
Although, under appropriate forms and methods of
procedure hereinafter considered, the courts may review
the action of city officials in awarding a contract, in
the absence of fraud, corruption or. abuse of discretion,
the determination of the proper officers in making an
award will not be disturbed by the courts. Thus, while
it is the court's duty to determine whether or not
municipal officials have exercised their discretion in
an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner, and to
determine the soundness of allegations of fraud,
collusion, or misconduct, a court will not attempt to
control the municipal discretion nor substitute its
judgment for that of the municipal officials. (Emphasis
added.)
McQuillin, Municipal corporations, section 29.83 (3rd Ed), citing
Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974); Clavton v. Salt
Lake Citv. 387 P.2d 93 (Utah 1963); and Schulte v. Salt Lake Citv.
10 P.2d 625 (Utah 1932).
In the Schulte case, the Utah Supreme Court stated the
following rule as the standard of judicial review where statutes
or ordinances require that contracts for public improvements be let
to the lowest responsible bidder:
Courts will not interfere with the decision of the city
authorities in awarding a contract if such decision is
founded upon such facts that it is not a manifest abuse
of discretion, is exercised in good faith, is in the
interest of the public and is without collusion or fraud,
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and is not influenced by motives of personal favoritism
or ill will.
(10 P.2d, at 628).

The above standard for judicial review of

contract awards has been applied by courts to review decisions
involving questions concerning both;

(1) the responsibility of

bidders and (2) the responsiveness of bids.

(In the present case,

both Wadsworth and Gerber were qualified as responsible bidders,
i.e., properly licensed and able to perform the contract in a
prompt

and

workmanlike

manner, and

the

only

issue was

the

responsiveness of Wadsworth1s bid.)
For example, in the case of State v. Bowers Office Products,
Inc., 621 P.2d 11 (Alaska 1980), the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that the superior court below erred in substituting its judgment
for that of the state department of administration as to the
department's finding that the plaintiff's bid was non-responsive
to the invitation.

The Court stated:

In Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1971) we
reversed a superior court decision in which the court had
substituted its judgment for that of the agency in
determining whether certain bids were non-responsive.
The proper judicial inquiry, we held, was whether there
was a reasonable basis for the agency's action. Our
decision rested on the policies underlying strict
enforcement of bidding procedures, and also on the
principle that courts should not interfere with the
policy decisions which are inherent in establishing
criteria to be applied in making awards.
621 P.2d, at 13.

The Court noted that a decision to strictly

enforce bidding procedures will necessarily lead to the rejection
of certain bids as non-responsive, and that a decision rejecting
a bid for non-responsiveness goes to the integrity of the entire
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competitive bidding process.

In ruling that the superior court

erred in substituting its judgment for that of the state department
of administration, the Court found that "...the department had a
'reasonable basis' to determine that the defect in Bowers1 bid was
material and that the bid was nonresponsive."

621 P.2d, at 14.

Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied a reasonable
basis test in reversing a decision of the district court below
which had substituted its judgment for that of the contracting
agency.

State v. Weisz & Sons. Inc., 713 P.2d 176 (Wyo. 1986).

After noting that the courts are warranted in setting aside an
agency's action only where the action is arbitrary or fraudulent
or where there is an illegal exercise of discretion, the court
stated:
We are unable to find from the statutes, applicable
case law, rules and regulations, and the record on appeal
that the procedures followed by [defendants] in seeking
bids and awarding the contract to be any other than
lawful, reasonable, and in the exercise of honest
judgment, good faith, and accepted competitive bid
practices. Under those circumstances, the judiciary of
this state cannot interfere and substitute its judgment
for that of the responsible agency or perform the duties
properly belonging to [defendants] in the awarding of a
contract.
713 P.2d, at 185.
By analogy, the federal courts have also applied a reasonable
basis test in reviewing allegations of abuse of discretion or
otherwise improper conduct involved in disputed contract awards
under the federal procurement system.

See Keco Industries v.

United States, 492 F.2d 1200 (Ct.Cl. 1974); M. Steinthal & Co. v.
Seamans. 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C.Cir. 1971).
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In Steinthal. the court

stated:
If the court finds a reasonable basis for the agency's
action, the court should stay its hand even though it
might, as an original proposition, have reached a
different conclusion as to the proper administration and
application of the procurement regulations.
455 F.2d, at 1301-02.
In the present case, there was no allegation or evidence m a t
the board of county commissioners acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
or abused its discretion in rejecting Wadsworth's bid as nonresponsive and in awarding the contract to Gerber.

Nor was there

any allegation of fraud or corruption in the awarding process. The
district court made no finding or conclusion that the board had
acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or had abused its discretion,
or was guilty of fraud or corruption; instead, the district court
simply substituted its own judgment for that of the board of county
commissioners.

The failure of the district court to apply the

correct standard of judicial review to the board's determination
in this case constituted error as a matter of law.
B.
IN RULING ON WADSWORTH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN
THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE COUNTY AND TO RESOLVE
ANY DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING THE EVIDENCE IN THE
COUNTY'S FAVOR.
In considering a motion for summary "judgment, ".•*the court
must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly
drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates,
Inc. , 739 P.2d 634, at 637 (Utah App. 1987); Frisbee v. K & K
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Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, at 389 (Utah 1984). This Court has
also applied the same standard when reviewing a summary judgment
granted by a lower court:
Our analytical standard for review of a summary judgment
is the same as that of the trial court: we review the
facts and inferences from those facts in the light most
favorable to the losing party.
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, at 1156 (Utah App. 1989); citing
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, at 946 (Utah App. 1989).
Viewing the facts and inferences from those facts in the light
most favorable to the County, the board of county commissioners
had a "reasonable basis" for its determination that Wadsworth's bid
was non-responsive to the County's invitation for bids, and the
board's determination was based upon such facts that it was not a
manifest abuse of discretion or the result of arbitrary or
capricious action.
The record establishes that, in tabulating and verifying the
bid

proposals,

the

County's

independent

outside

consultant,

Eckhoff, Watson and Preator Engineering (Consultant), found that
the bid proposal submitted by Wadsworth listed two prices on
Schedule D for Item 1 Basin Floodwalls and also listed two prices
in both the Schedule D Subtotal and the Total Bid boxes on the
Bidding Schedule Summary. Because this constituted an addition to
the bid form, an alternative proposal, and a modification of the
bid form which was not specifically called for in the contract
documents, in violation of the Rules Governing Bids set forth in
the Instructions to Bidders, the Consultant recommended that the
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County reject Wadsworth's bid proposal as being non-responsive and
award the contract to Gerber (R. 289-302).
At the public hearing on August 14, 1985, the board of county
commissioners, after having reviewed the bidding documents and
having

considered

interested

the

statements

parties, declined

and

recommendations

to waive the

of

all

irregularities

in

Wadsworth's bid proposal and voted to award the contract to Gerber
for the reasons that:

(1) the bid proposal form submitted by

Wadsworth contained multiple entries in several places, including
two different figures in the box for the total bid price, thus
making the bid proposal ambiguous as to the total price; and (2)
the two different figures in the total bid price in the Wadsworth
bid ($692,640.48 and $792,140.48) straddled the total bid price of
the Gerber bid ($739,414.62), thus giving the Wadsworth bid an
unfair competitive advantage by allowing Wadsworth to claim either
figure as its intended total bid price (R. 313-330, 302) .
An irregularity in a bid will render the bid materially nonresponsive where the bidder gains "...a substantial advantage or
benefit not enjoyed by other bidders."

Carl Bolander & Sons Co.

v. City of Minneapolis, 438 N.W.2d 735 (Minn.App. 1989), affirmed,
451 N.W.2d 204, at 207 (Minn. 1990);

Farmer Construction Ltd. v.

State Dept. of Gen. Admin., 656 P.2d 1087 (Wash. 1983);

State v.

New Mexico Deot. of Fin. & Admin., 704 P.2d 79 (N.M.App. 1985).
For example, in Bolander, the lowest bidder failed to list
women-owned

subcontractors

in

its

invitation.

The court ruled that this irregularity made the bid
20

bid

as

required

by

the

materially

non-responsive

advantages:

because

it

gave

the

bidder

two

(1) the ability to "repent" after discovering its bid

was too low or otherwise too difficult to fulfill, and (2) the
opportunity to further negotiate.

451 N.W.2d, at 206-7.

In the present case, Wadsworth's inclusion of two different
figures in various places in its bid, including

in the box

designated for the Total Bid Price, gave Wadsworth an advantage not
enjoyed

by

other

bidders.

The

multiple

price

entries

in

Wadsworth's bid gave Wadsworth the ability to "repent" after the
bid opening. Like the bidder in Bolander, Wadsworth placed itself
in a position where it could "repent its bid" if, after the bid
opening, it "

discovered it had bid too low in comparison to the

other bidders and would lose money on the job."
207.

451 N.W.2d, at

This test is particularly relevant in the present case in

view of the evidence that, prior to submitting Wadsworth's bid,
Ralph Wadsworth was worried that the bid prepared by his son was
too low (more than $200,000.00 below the Engineer's Estimate of
$928,615.70), and in view of Guy Wadsworth's statement that "...we
wanted to hedge our bets, I guess."
In

addition,

the

irregularity

in

Wadsworth's

bid

gave

Wadsworth an unfair advantage by allowing Wadsworth to "further
negotiate11 after the bid opening by choosing the most favorable of
the two price figures as its intended bid, after comparing its bid
to those of other bidders.

The two total ptice figures submitted

by wadsworth straddled the total price figure submitted by Gerber,
one high and one low. If there had been no other bidder within the
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high to low range of Wadsworth's two figures, then Wadsworth could
have argued for the higher pencil price by requesting that the
pencil informality be waived, as the County has on occasion waived
the ink requirement and the requirement that all prices be in
writing as well as in numbers.

It is important to note that

Wadsworth failed to write its prices both in words and numerals,
as required by section 1.2.04 of the Instructions to Bidders.
In summary, viewing the above facts and reasonable inferences
from those facts in the light most favorable to the County, the
board

of

rejecting

county

commissioners

Wadsworth1s

had

bid proposal

County's invitation for bids.

a

"reasonable

basis" for

as non-responsive

to the

The irregularity contained in the

bid proposal submitted by Wadsworth violated the Rules Governing
Bids and made Wadsworth's bid materially non-responsive because:
(1) it was ambiguous as to the total bid price, and (2) it gave
Wadsworth an unfair competitive advantage by allowing Wadsworth to
claim either of the two bid prices as its intended bid after the
bids were opened.

The board's determination was not arbitrary or

capricious or an abuse of discretion, and in the absence of such
a finding, the district court erred, as a matter of law, by
improperly substituting the court's own judgment for that of the
board as to whether or not Wadsworth's bid was responsive to the
County's invitation for bids.
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POINT II
EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, WADSWORTH'S BID PROPOSAL WAS WRONGFULLY
REJECTED, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN WADSWORTH'S FAVOR UNDER THE THEORIES OF BREACH OF
CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENCE.
Wadsworth alleged in its motion for summary judgment that it
was entitled to recover damages in the nature of lost profits under
two separate theories of liability, namely:

(1) "breach of

contract to award the project to Wadsworth" and (2) "negligence in
considering and rejecting Wadsworth's bid" (R. 225).
The district court granted Wadsworth's motion for summary
judgment "as prayed" and ruled that: "Defendants [County] breached
contractual duties and duties of due care owing to plaintiff in
rejecting plaintiff's bid as nonresponsive." (R. 430). It is the
County's position that Wadsworth was not entitled to summary
judgment under either theory of liability.
A.
THERE WAS NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP, EITHER EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND WADSWORTH; THEREFORE,
THERE COULD BE NO BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL DUTIES BY THE
COUNTY.
Courts in all jurisdictions, including Utah, have universally
held that an advertisement for bids is not itself an offer, rather
the bid is the offer which creates no rights until accepted.
Particularly in the case of public contracts, there is no contract
even after acceptance of the bid until there has been compliance
with certain formalities required by law, such as a written
contract.

1 Williston on Contracts, (3rd Ed.) section 31.
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In Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974), the Utah
Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of whether a bid
proposal submitted in response to an invitation to bid for a public
construction contract creates any contractual relationship, either
express or implied, between the bidder and the public authority.
The Court concluded that it did not.
In the Rapp case, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for
expenses he incurred in preparing and submitting a bid to construct
a building at the Salt Lake City International Airport.

The

plaintiff protested the City's award of the contract to the
successful bidder on the grounds that the action of the City was
not taken in good faith and that the City had failed to disclose
to the bidders that a competitive advantage had been granted to the
successful bidder.

The City filed a motion for summary judgment,

which the trial court granted.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to
recover damages on several theories, all of which were rejected by
the Utah Supreme Court.

The first theory plaintiff argued was

breach of contract, contending that he had "a collateral implied
in fact contract" which was breached by the City:
Plaintiff urges that in a bidding situation two distinct
contracts are involved. Under the first contract, since
the governmental entity might reject all bids, the
solicitation of bids is not a promise to accept the
lowest or best bid; plaintiff concedes that the bid is
a mere offer which must be accepted and all statutory
formalities fulfilled prior to the existence of a binding
contract. He insists that there is a second, collateral
contract under which the government bv soliciting bids
impliedly promises to give fair consideration to all of
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the competitive bids and this promise is supported by the
time, effort, and expense in so preparing the bid*
(Emphasis added.)
527 P.2d, at 654.

The Utah Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's

argument that there was any implied contract between the bidder and
the government.

After first explaining the distinction between

express and implied in fact contracts, the Court stated that there
could be no contractual liability, express or implied, binding upon
the City until the requirements of a writing and sanction of the
board of commissioners had been complied with:
[1] An ordinary advertisement for a bid is not
itself an offer, rather the bid or the tender is an offer
which creates no right until accepted. Particularly in
the case of public contracts, the requirements of certain
formalities by law, such as a written contract, indicates
that even after acceptance of the bid, there is no
contract until there has been compliance with the
requisite formalities. (Emphasis added.)
527 P.2d, at 654. The Court then held that the City's invitation
to

bid

and

the

plaintiff's

response

thereto

could

not

be

interpreted as "a manifestation of mutual assent to make a bargain"
out of which a binding contract could arise:
[2] The invitation to bid by the City may not be
interpreted as an offer for a binding contract; this
action and plaintiff's response may not be reasonably
construed as a manifestation of mutual assent indicating
an intention of the parties to be bound by a contract,
the terms of which were certain.
Additionally,
plaintiff's theory must fail since no contractual
liability can be created without compliance with the
previously cited ordinances.
527 P.2d, at 654.
Applying the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court in
the Rapp decision to the facts of the present case, and viewing the
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facts in the light most favorable to the County, there was no
contract between the County and Wadsworth.

The invitation of the

County to bid and Wadsworth's response cannot be reasonably
interpreted as a "manifestation of mutual assent to make a bargain,
the terms of which were certain."

First, because the County's

Invitation to Bid was expressly conditioned upon the acceptance of
the proposal and the awarding of the contract by the board of
county commissioners, there could be no "manifestation of mutual
assent to make a bargain" prior to the occurrence
condition.

of that

Second, the County's ordinances, like the City's

ordinances relied upon by the Court in the Rapp case, provide that
no contract shall be binding on the County unless it is reduced to
writing and approved by the board of county commissioners:
Contracts. The commission shall make or authorize
the making of all contracts to which the county may be
a party, and no contract shall be entered into on behalf
of or be binding on the county unless it is entered into
by ordinance or resolution or is reduced to writing and
approved by the commission, or expressly authorized by
ordinance or resolution. No such ordinance or resolution
shall be passed until it has remained on file at least
one week. (Emphasis added.)
The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966 as amended,
section 1-2-9.

Under the holding of the Supreme Court in Rapp,

there could be no contract between the County cind Wadsworth until
there had been compliance with the previously cited requisite
formalities of an ordinance or resolution or a contract reduced to
writing and approved by the commission.

In the absence of the

required formalities, there was no contract between the County and
Wadsworth.

As a result, there could be no breach of contractual
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duties by the County.
Thus, the district court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling
that the County breached contractual duties owed to Wadsworth and
in granting summary judgment in Wadsworth!s favor under a breach
of contract theory.
B.
THE COURTS HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED ANY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
"NEGLIGENT CONSIDERATION AND REJECTION OF BIDS" IN THE
AREA OF PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS.
Wadsworth alleged in its motion for summary judgment that it
was entitled to recover damages in the nature of lost profits for
the County's "negligence in considering and rejecting Wadsworthfs
bid." (R. 225).
In support of this contention, Wadsworth cited four cases in
its memorandum (R. 243-244). A review of these cases reveals that
none of them involve "negligent consideration and rejection of
bids" on public construction contracts.

Moreover, the County is

not aware of any cases from any jurisdiction which have applied a
simple negligence standard as the appropriate standard of judicial
review for contested awards of public construction contracts. See
Annotation, 65 ALR4th 93, section 14.
The appropriate standard of judicial review for contested
awards of public construction contracts, as discussed above under
Point I, is that the courts will not attempt to control the
discretion of public officials nor substitute the courts1 judgment
for that of the public officials, except upon a finding of abuse
of discretion, fraud, or corruption.
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It has been observed:

.. .courts generally will not interfere in the competitive
bidding process even if the agency's decision appears
erroneous or if reasonable persons may disagree. To
overturn any allegedly incorrect award, the court would
have to find that it was arbitrary and capricious, a
relatively rare occurrence. (Emphasis added.)
Stein, Construction Law, Vol. 1 (Matthew Bender 1990) section
2.03[3][b][i]; Liberty County v. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete. 421
So.2d 505 (Fla. 1982).
In the present case, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in Wadsworth's favor under a theory of negligence
for the following reasons.

First, Wadsworth's complaint fails to

allege a claim for negligence.

Second, even if it did allege a

claim for negligence, such claim has not been recognized by the
courts as an actionable claim in light of the appropriate standard
of judicial review for contested awards of public construction
contracts, as discussed above.

Third, even if such claim were

actionable, summary judgment was inappropriate in the present case
in view of the evidence in the record which, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the County, raises genuine issues as to
material

facts

commissioners

such

as:

exercised

(1) whether
reasonable

the

care

board

in

of

county

considering

and

rejecting Wadsworth's bid proposal, (2) whether Wadsworth was
contributorily negligent by having submitted admittedly confusing
multiple sets of bid prices in its bid proposal, and (3) the
percentage

of

negligence

attributable

Wadsworth in this action.
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to

the

County

and

to

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT WADSWORTH WAS
ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES IN THE NATURE OF ANTICIPATED
LOST PROFITS.
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that the County
wrongfully rejected Wadsworthfs bid and is liable for "breach of
contract to award the project to Wadsworth" or "negligence in
considering and rejecting Wadsworthfs bid," all of which the County
disputes as discussed above, the district court erred, as a matter
of law in ruling that Wadsworth was entitled to recover damages in
the nature of anticipated lost profits in the amount of $62,344.15.
A.
THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO A WRONGFULLY REJECTED BIDDER
ON A PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT DO NOT INCLUDE AN AWARD
OF ANTICIPATED LOST PROFITS.
Although the courts have recognized a number of various
remedies available to wrongfully rejected bidders in the area of
public construction contracts, such as injunction, declaratory
relief, or mandamus, the courts have uniformly rejected claims for
anticipated lost profits:
An unsuccessful bidder on a state or local public
construction contract cannot recover lost profits, as a
measure of damages in a successful suit, in the absence
of fraud or other extraordinary circumstances.
The
courts generally reason that lost profits are obtainable
only as a remedy for breach of contract.
Because a
disappointed bidder on a project never actually entered
into a contract, under which it would have made such
anticipated profits, there is no breach of contract and,
therefore, no recovery. A bidder may, however, be able
to recover bid preparation costs or damages for civil
rights violations or for malicious interference with the
right to secure a contract. (Emphasis added.)
Stein, Construction Law, section 2.03[3] [c] (Matthew Bender, 1990),
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citing, e.g., Rubino v. Lolli. 10 Cal.App.3d 1059, 89 Cal.Rptr 320
(1970); Old Town Development Corp. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 249
Cal.App.2d 313, 57 Cal.Rptr. 426 (1967); William A. Berbusse, Jr.,
Inc. v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 117 So.2d 550 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
1960); Hassett Storage Warehouse v. Board of Elect.. 69 Ill.App.3d
972, 387 N.E.2d 785 (1979); Paul Sardella Constr. Co. v. Braintree
Housing Auth., 371 Mass. 235, 356 N.E.2d 249 (1976); Talbot Pav.
Co. v. Citv of Detroit, 109 Mich. 657, 67 N.W. 979 (1896); M.A.
Stephen Constr. Co. v. Borough of Rumson, 125 N.J.Super. 67, 308
A.2d 380, cert, denied, 64 N.J. 315, 315 A.2d 404 (1973); Latin
Belly Ltd. v. State, 83 App.Div.2d 706, 442 N.Y.S.2d 265, appeal
dismissed, 55 N.Y.2d 603, 447 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 131 N.E.2d 643 (1981);
Carroll-Ratner Corp. v. City Manager. 54 Misc.2d 625, 283 N.Y.S.2d
218 (Sup.Ct. 1967); R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. School Dist., 400 Pa. 391,
162 A.2d 623 (1960).
Ed.), section 29.86.

See McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd
See also Annotation:

Public Contracts: Low

Bidder's Monetary Relief Against State or Local Agency for Nonaward
of Contract, 65 ALR4th 93.
As recognized by the courts in the above-cited cases, there
are sound public policy reasons for the rule that a disappointed
bidder does not have a right of action for damages against a public
body based upon a statutory requirement that contracts for the
construction of public works shall be let to the lowest bidder.
First,

such

statutes

and

ordinances

are

enacted

as

a

protection to the public treasury, and the power for letting public
contracts pursuant thereto is exercised for the public benefit and
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is not intended as a direct benefit to any particular bidder.
Second, the failure of public officials to award a contract
to the lowest bidder should not be grounds for penalizing the
public twice; by first requiring the additional expenditure of
public funds on the awarded contract and then allowing recovery for
lost profits to the aggrieved low bidder.
Third, awarding lost profits would encourage bidders to delay
the filing of their bid protests until after construction has begun
or been completed, thereby subjecting public entities to endless
lawsuits by disappointed bidders and resulting in greater costs to
the public than if a timely protest had been filed prior to the
start of construction when injunctive or declaratory relief would
have been available.
Although courts refuse to award damages in the nature of lost
profits, a few courts have begun to allow a wrongfully rejected
bidder

to

recover

circumstances.
recovery:

bid

preparation

costs

under

certain

The courts have used two legal theories to allow

(1) that it is an implied condition of every invitation

for bids issued by a public authority that each bid will be fairly
considered in accordance with competitive bidding statutes, similar
to the federal model in the U.S. Claims Court; and (2) promissory
estoppel.

Stein, Construction Law, section 2.03[3][c].

For example, in Paul Sardella Construction Co. v. Braintree
Housing Authority, 356 N.E.2d 249 (Mass. 1976), the court held that
where the public authority had failed to give fair consideration
to all of the submitted bids as required by the applicable statute,
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the proper measure of recovery to the wrongfully rejected bidder
was "the reasonable cost of preparing the bid."
766-67.
1084

356 N.E.2d, at

See also Owen of Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County, 648 F.2d

(6th Cir.

California

and

1981).

Similarly,

Florida,

have

two

allowed

other
the

jurisdictions,

recovery

of

bid

preparation costs to wrongfully rejected bidders where injunctive
or declaratory relief was ineffective because the contract was
partially or fully performed during the pendency of the protest.
The California and Florida courts relied upon the theory of
promissory estoppel in allowing recovery of bid preparation costs.
Swinerton & Walbera v. City of Incrlewood, 40 Cal.App.3d 98, 114
Cal.Rptr. 834

(1974) ; Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete v. Liberty

County, 406 So.2d 461 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1981), rev'd, 421 So.2d 505
(Fla. 1982).
However, in the Rapp case cited above, the Utah Supreme Court
declined to follow the minority view which allows the recovery of
bid preparation costs under an implied contract theory.
the Utah Supreme Court specifically

In Rapp,

rejected the plaintiff's

contention that there was an implied contract "...under which the
government by soliciting bids impliedly promises to give fair
consideration to all of the competitive bids and this promise is
supported by the time, effort, and expense in so preparing the
bid." 527 P.2d 651, at 654. Instead, the Court in Rapp denied the
recovery of bid preparation costs sought under a theory of implied
contract.

The Utah Supreme Court adopted the majority viewpoint

which takes the position that an unsuccessful bidder may not
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recover money damages in the nature of either lost profits or bid
preparation costs.
B.
EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, WADSWORTH WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
DAMAGES IN THE NATURE OF LOST PROFITS, WADSWORTH FAILED
TO CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, THEREBY
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In ruling that Wadsworth was entitled to recover lost profits
in the amount of $62,344.15, the district court relied on the two
sworn affidavits of Ralph L. Wadsworth (R. 226-228, 378-380). The
County filed a motion to strike these affidavits (R. 419-420).
In Howarth v. Ostergaard, 515 P.2d 442 (Utah 1973), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the plaintifffs claimed loss of anticipated
profits

from

considered.
for

loss

a

business

venture was

too

speculative

to be

The Court noted the rule that no recovery can be had

of profits which

are determined

to

be uncertain,

contingent, conjectural, or speculative:
The problem as to when and under what circumstances
damages may be recovered for loss in operating a business
is, as is true in so many controversial areas in the law,
a coin that has at least two sides to it. The basic and
general rule is that loss of anticipated profits of a
business venture involve so many factors of uncertainty
that ordinarily profits to be realized in the future are
too speculative to base an award of damages thereon. The
other side of the coin is that damages to a business or
enterprise need only be proved with sufficient certainty
that reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance
of the evidence that the damages were actually suffered.
(Emphasis added.)
515 P.2d, at 445.
Applying the law to the facts of the present case, material
issues of fact exist with regard to the amount, if any, of

33

Wadsworth1s alleged damages in the nature of lost profits, thereby
precluding summary judgment.
First, Ralph Wadsworth's own contradictory sworn statements
show uncertainty as to lost profits. His affidavits contradict and
are contradicted by his sworn answers to defendants' first set of
interrogatories, which allege lost profits

in the amount of

$69,263.45 (R. 352-357).
Second,

both

sworn

affidavits

are

completely

without

foundation in that they are not supported by any business records,
business profit history, expert testimony, or other reliable
evidence.

They merely reflect amounts which Wadsworth hoped to

make on the project.

Because the affidavits are without proper

foundation, they do not set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, as required by Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

In addition, Ralph Wadsworth, who swore to and signed

both affidavits, testified at his deposition that he did not have
anything to do with the preparation of the bid, that he was not
involved at all as far as providing the figures that went into the
bid document, except for adding the pencil figures just prior to
the bid opening, and that he did not actually review the bid
document (R. 438, pp. 5-9).
Third,

in

response

to

defendants1

first

set

of

interrogatories, Wadsworth was unable to identify or produce any
documentation relating to the factual basis or evidence upon which
the claimed calculation Of damages was based (R. 352-353) . In the
absence of any documentation for critical items such as the bid
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price amounts from subcontractors or the prices available to
Wadsworth for equipment, labor, and materials, there exists only
uncertainty and speculation as to the factual basis for Wadsworth1s
calculation of damages.

In addition, Wadsworth1s answers to

interrogatories concerning the calculation of damages establish
that Wadsworth took no steps to reduce or mitigate its damages,
which failure should reduce or eliminate Wadsworth1s claim under
the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
Fourth, Wadsworth's claim that he intended to make, and would
have made, a 10% profit on the project ignores the realities and
uncertainties inherent in the area of public works construction
projects. Especially in view of the fact that Wadsworth1s claimed
intended bid was more than $200,000.00 below the Engineer's
Estimate of $928,615.70, it is highly uncertain and speculative
that Wadsworth would have made its hoped-for profit.

It is more

probable that Wadsworth would have lost money on the job, being so
far below the Engineerfs Estimate of the project costs.

In

addition, Wadsworth failed to show any prior business history where
it had made a 10% profit on any single project or on any regular
basis which would remove its claim from the realms of conjecture
and speculation.
Accordingly, Wadsworth's claimed amount of lost profits was
uncertain, and genuine issues of material fact existed with regard
to the amount, if any, of Wadsworth's claimed damages, thus
precluding summary judgment.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants respectfully request
that the Court vacate the summary judgment entered by the district
court below and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 15th day of October, 1990.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

i/HSTHORPE
~
EY/
Deputy/County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jeffrey H. Thorpe, certify that on the 15th day of October,
1990, I served four copies of the attached Brief of Appellants upon
Beesley & Fairclough, counsel for the appellee in this matter, by
personally serving it at the following address:

300 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellees
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ADDENDA

WILFORD A. BEESLEY #0257
STANFORD P. FITTS #4834
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
3 00 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RALPH L. WADSWORTH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,

i
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

:
::

vs.

Civil No. C-85-5681

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political •

subdivision of the State of
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH,
:
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION,
s
Defendants.

Judge James S. Sawaya

:

The Motion of plaintiff Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction
Company, Inc. for Summary Judgment came on regularly before the
above entitled Court on November 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m., the
Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. Plaintiff was represented by
Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. Fitts, Esq. and defendants
were represented by Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Esq.

The Court, having

considered the memoranda submitted and arguments of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND
DECREES:

1

CO

1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff Ralph L*

Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. is hereby granted as prayed.
2.

Defendants were required to award the subject construction

project to the low, responsive, responsible bidder.
3.

Plaintiff was the low, responsive, responsible bidder on

the subject project and defendants should have awarded the project
to plaintiff.
4.
care

Defendants breached contractual duties and duties of due

owing

to

plaintiff

in

rejecting

plaintiff's

bid

as

nonresponsive.
5. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants and each
of them in the amount of $62,344.15 together with plaintiff's costs
incurred in this matter and prejudgment interest at the statutory
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from March 27, 1987 until the
date of judgment.
6.

Plaintiff is entitled to post judgment interest at the

statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of
this Judgment until paid in full.
Dated this

/**T

day of December, 1989.
BY T

imes S. Sawaya
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

-^^^•//•'idi^

Esq.

oo

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this

/^"^day of

December, 1989:
Jeffery H. Thorpe
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

K^r4^

00^3

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);

Rule 56

J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P. 2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev 937.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
^ ^ o r f l l i n g 0 f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
^55

" c S S . - 41921C3J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
AX.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

F
"*? * * " ?**
°/ a P ? l i c a t i o n ** d f
f f
fault J u t o n t where notice is required only
bv
custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers — Judgment «=» 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.

Damages.

Discovery.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Summary judgment.

158

1.2.1—1-2-4

ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCES
Chapter 2
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Sections:
1-2-1.
1-2-2.
1-2-3.
1-2-4.
1-2-5.
1-2-6.
1-2-7.
1-2-8.
1-2-9.

County Commission — Number — Eligibility
Term of Office
Vacancies — How Filled
Powers and Duties — Omnibus Provision
Departments
Meetings
Special Meetings
Chairman — Quorum —- May Administer Oaths
Contracts

Sec. 1-2-1. County Commission — Number — Eligibility. The Salt
Lake County Commission shall consist of three members, each of whom
shall have been an elector of the county for at least one year immediately
preceding the election and elected by the qualified electors of the coimty
at large.
Sec 1-2-2. Term of Office. County commissioners shall be elected at
the general election next preceding the expiration of the term of office
of incumbents; one for a term of four years and one for a term of two
years, and each shall hold office for the term for which elected and until
a successor is elected and has qualified
Sec 1-2-3. Vacancies — How Filled. Whenever a vacancy occurs in
the board of county commissioners through ineligibility, resignation or
death of the incumbent or of the officer elect before qualifying, or through
refusal to act, or for any other reason, the board must fill the vacancy
by appointment. Should the board fail to make the appointment within
thirty days after the vacancy occurs, the clerk shall notify the governor
of the fact, and the governor shall within thirty days after receipt of notice
fill the vacancy by appointment. If at any time there shall not be a majority of the board remaining in office, the governor shall appoint one
or two commissioners as the case may be until there shall be a majority,
and the majority shall select the third as herein provided. Appointees
shall hold office for the unexpired term. Any appointment under the provisions of this section must be made from a list of at least six persons
who have been endorsed in writing by the central county committee of
the party to which the person belonged who occasioned the vacancy.
Sec 1-2-4. Powers and Duties — Omnibus Provision. The county commission shall be the legislative division of county government and may
supervise the official conduct of all county and department officers and
6
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officers of all precincts, districts and other subdivisions of the county (except
municipal corporations), and shall see that they faithfully perform their
duties, direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and, when necessary, require
them to renew their official bond, make reports and present their books and
accounts for inspection. The commission shall have such other powers and
duties as are prescribed by law.
Sec. 1-2-5. Departments. Each commissioner shall have the supervision of
such departments and boards of county government as lend themselves to
joint classification and each department or board shall bear such title and
designation as the board of county commissioners shall from time to time
devise, provided, that said title shall, as nearly as possible, represent the true
nature of those functions performed by the officers and employees of sr *
department or board.
Sec. 1-2-6. Meetings. The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, shall hold three regular public meetings in each and
every week during the year in the Commission Chambers in the City and
County Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, which meetings shall be held on
Monday and Wednesday at the hour often o'clock A.M., and Thursday at ni)»
o'clock A.M., except that in case any of such days falls upon a holiday, said
meeting shall be deemed adjourned until the next succeeding meeting date as
aforesaid, provided, however, that the time of said meetings may be changed
or altered to any other time on the same day by the vote of at least two (2)
members of the said Board, duly entered into the minutes of any preceding
meeting thereof; and provided further, that any meeting of the said Board
may be recessed, once convened, to any other time, place or day prior to the
next succeeding regular meeting. Any regularly scheduled meeting may I
cancelled in advance by a vote of any two members of said Board taken at a
duly convened regular meeting, in the event there will be no business to
transact or when it is known in advance a quorum cannot be obtained.
(Amended 5/29/75.)

Sec. 1-2-7. Special Meetings. Special meetings may be called by any two
commissioners or by the chairman upon a five-day notice to any absent
commissioner and upon entry into the minutes of the board of an order signed
by the members or chairman calling such meeting, provided, that the
requirement of a notice shall not be binding in any special meeting at which all
of the members of the commission are present and effectively waive such
requirement.
It shall be the duty of the county clerk when given copies of such notices
to serve or cause the same to be served immediately.
The order must specify the business to be transacted at such special
meeting and none other than that specified shall be transacted thereat unless
all members of the commission are present and consent thereto.
Sec. 1-2-8. Chairman — Quorum — May Administer Oaths. County commissioners shall elect one of their members chairman to preside at all meetings of the board. In case of the chairman's absence or inability to act, the
(Printed 6/30/80)
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members present must, by an order entered in their minutes, select one of
their members to act as chairman temporarily. Any member of the board may
administer oaths to any person when necessary in the performance of his
official duties. Not less than two members shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business, and no act of the board shall be valid or binding unless
two members concur therein.
Sec. 1-2-9. Contracts. The commission shall make or authorize the making
of all contracts to which the county may be a party, and no contract shall be
entered into on behalf of or be binding on the county unless it is entered into
by ordinance or resolution or is reduced to writing and approved by the
commission, or expressly authorized by ordinance or resolution. No such
ordinance or resolution shall be passed until it has remained on file at least
one week.
Chapter 3
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Sections:
1-3-1.
1-3-2.
1-3-3.
1-3-4.
1-3-5.
1-3-6.
1-3-7.
1-3-8.
1-3-9.

Purpose
Administrative Classifications - Employment of
Administrative Personnel
Administrative Services
Human Services
Public Works
Limitation
Executive Council
Steering Council
Policies and Procedures

Sec. 1-3-1. Purpose. It is the intent of the board of county commissioners
to organize the executive department of county government in a manner
designed to provide service delivery to the public in an efficient and
coordinated manner. Certain of the divisions, boards and commissions
described in this chapter have statutory duties and contractual prerogatives
independent of authority delegated by the board of county commissioners and
it is not the intent of the board to preempt, abrogate or diminish such
authority. Neither are the functional descriptions meant to be exhaustive of
the duties assigned and delegated to the respective organizational
subdivisions. However, it is deemed necessary by the board of county
commissioners to include all subdivisions of government within a single
management structure for purposes of effective administration and
coordination. Further, all county executive authority not expressly granted
by law or interlocal agreement to other officers, boards or commissions is
reserved to the board of county commissioners acting jointly, severally or
through its administrative designees and the exercise of such authority is
subject to the board's final approval and direction.
(Printed 6/30/80)
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18-1-1
Chapter 1

PURCHASING PROCEDURES
Sections:
18-1-1.
18-1-2.
18-1-3.
18-1-4.
18-1-5.
18-1-6.
18-1-7.
18-1-8.

Purchase Orders and Contracts — Competitive Bids
Contracts Not Requiring Competitive Bids
Emergency Contracts
Requisition Agents
Advertisements for Bids — Deposits
Collusion Among Bidders and Disclosures — Prohibition
Opening of Bids
Awarding of Contracts — Filing of Purchase Order or Conto
— Public Inspection
18-1-9. Responsibility of Bidders — Determination
18-1-10. Rejection of Bids
18-1-11. Bonds of Bidders
18-1-12. Assignment of Contracts

Sec. 18-1-1. Purchase Orders and Contracts — Competitive Bids. Excel*
as otherwise herein provided, all county purchase orders and contracts of
every kind, involving amounts in excess of $5,000.00, for labor and services,
or for the purchase, lease, or sale of personal property, materials, equipment
or supplies, shall be let by competitive bidding after advertisement, to the
lowest responsible bidder, or in the appropriate instance, to the higher
responsible bidder, depending upon whether the county is to expend or to
receive the money.
All purchase orders or contracts less than $5,000.00, and in excess of
$300.00, shall be let in the open market in a manner calculated to insure the
best interests of the public and after solicitation of bids by mail, telephone or
otherwise. All bids in excess of $1,000.00 shall be in writing. Unless otherwise
authorized by the board of county commissioners, the purchasing agent shall
obtain at least three competitive bids.
The commission may waive the above requirements at such time as the
public good justifies such action and shall not be prohibited by the terms of
this section from awarding contracts or purchase orders without
advertisement or other solicitation if the item to be procured is a brand-name
type product which can be procured from only one source. Any department,
office, board or other agency of the county desiring to requisition a
brand-name type product which would require a waiver of the bidding
requirements in this section must submit a letter of justification to the
purchasing agent which must specify why the brand-name type product is
required and set forth the reasons why normal bidding requirements should
be waived. No contract or purchase order in excess of $500.00 may be awarded
(Printed 6/30/80)
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for such brand-name type product without the approval of the commission.
The purchasing agent must, in the performance of his duties, comply with
the requirements specified in 17-15-3 U.C.A. 1953.
Sec. 18-1-2. Contracts Not Requiring Competitive Bids. Contracts which
by their nature are not adapted to award by competitive bidding, such as
contracts for the services of individuals possessing a high degree of professional skill, where the ability or fitness of the individual plays an important
part, contracts for the printing of finance committee pamphlets, auditor's
estimates and departmental reports, contracts for the printing or engraving
of bonds, water certificates, tax warrants and other evidences of
indebtedness, contracts for utility services such as water, light, heat,
telephone and telegraph, and contracts for the purchase of magazines, books,
periodicals, and similar articles of an educational or instructional nature, shall
not be subject to the competitive bidding requirements of this ordinance. The
purchasing agent is expressly authorized to procure from any federal, state or
local unit, or agency thereof, such materials, supplies, commodities or their
equivalent, as may be made available through the operation of any legislation,
without conforming to the competitive bidding requirements of this chapter.
Regular employment contracts in the service of the county, whether with
respect to classified service which may be later enacted, or otherwise, shall
not be subject to the provisions of this chapter, nor shall this chapter be
applicable to the granting or issuance, pursuant to powers conferred by laws,
ordinances or resolutions, of franchises, licenses, permits or other
authorizations by the corporate authorities of the municipality, or by
departments, offices, institutions, boards, commissions, agencies or other
instrumentalities of the county.
Sec. 18-1-3. Emergency Contracts. In case of an emergency affecting the
public health or safety, the Salt Lake County Commission may, at a duly
convened meeting, unanimously require, without public advertisement, that
contracts be let to the extent necessary to resolve such emergency. The
resolution or ordinance permitting such action shall fix the date upon which
such emergency shall terminate, provided that such date may be extended or
abridged by the commission as circumstances require.
The purchasing agent, or any agency of the county authorized in writing
by the purchasing agent, may, subject to the approval of the board of county
commissioners, purchase in the open market without filing a requisition for
estimate, and without advertisement, supplies, materials or equipment in an
amount not exceeding $10,000.00. A full written account of any such
emergency, together with a requisition for the materials, supplies or
equipment which it required, shall be submitted immediately to the
purchasing agent and shall be open to public inspection for a period of at least
one year subsequent to the date of the emergency purchase.
(Printed 6/30/80)
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Sec. 18-1-4. Requisition Agents. Each major department, office, board or
other agency of the county shall certify in writing to the purchasing agent the
names of such officers or employees as shall be authorized to sign requests for
purchases for such agency, and all such requests for purchases shall be void
unless executed by such certified officers or employees and approved by the
purchasing agent.
Except as to emergency contracts, no undertaking involving amounts in
excess of $5,000.00 shall be split into parts by any concerned party so as to
produce amounts of $5,000.00 or less, for the purpose of avoiding the
provisions of this ordinance.
Sec. 18-1-5. Advertisements for Bids — Deposits. All proposals to award
purchase orders or contracts involving amounts in excess of $5,000.00 shall be
published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation published in Salt
Lake County. The board of county commissioners may reject any an all bids
for any valid reason. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to
prohibit the purchasing agent from placing additional announcements in
recognized trade journals. Advertisements for bids shall describe the
character of the proposed contract or agreement in sufficient detail to enable
prospective bidders to know what their obligations will be. The description
may be made either in the advertisement itself, or by reference to detailed
plans and specifications on file at the time of the publication of the first
announcement. The advertisement shall state the date, time and place
assigned for the opening of bids, and no bids shall be received at any time
subsequent to the time indicated in the announcement. An extension of time
may, however, be granted for the opening of such bids upon publication in ?
newspaper of general circulation throughout Salt Lake County of the date to
which the bid opening has been extended. The time for the opening of the
extended bid shall be not less than 10 days after the publication thereof,
Sundays and legal Holidays excluded.
Cash, a cashier's check, a certified check or a comptroller's certificate of
monies owed the particular vendor, as a deposit of good faith, in a reasonable
amount, but not in excess of 10% of the contract amount, may be required of
each bidder by the purchasing agent on all bids involving amounts in excess of
$5,000.00.
Sec. 18-1-6. Collusion Among Bidders and Disclosures — Prohibition.
Any agreement or collusion among bidders or prospective bidders, to bid a
fixed price shall render the bids of such bidders void. Each bidder shall
accompany his bid with a sworn statement that he has not been a party to any
such agreement. Any disclosure made or permitted by the purchasing agent
in advance of the opening of bids, of the terms of the bids submitted in
response to an advertisement, shall render the entire proceeding void and
shall require re-advertisement and re-award.
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Sec. 18-l-7o Opening of Bids. All sealed bids shall be publicly opened by
the purchasing agent or by an officer or employee in the office of the
purchasing agent who is duly authorized in writing by the purchasing agent to
open such bids.
Sec. 18-1-8. Awarding of Contracts — Filing of Purchase Order or
Contract — Public Inspection. The award of any contract involving amounts
in excess of $5,000.00 shall be made by the board of county commissioners to
the lowest or highest responsible bidders meeting specifications as provided
in section 18-1-5 above. Each bid, with the name of the bidder, shall be
entered on a record, which record, with the name of the successful bidder
indicated thereon, shall after award of the contract or purchase order, be
open to public inspection in the office of the purchasing agentc
All purchase orders or contracts involving amounts of $5,000.00 or less
shall be awarded by the purchasing agent to the lowest or highest responsible
bidders as provided in section 18-1-1 above and shall be signed by the
purchasing agent and submitted to the commission for approval and
ratification.
An official copy of each awarded purchase order or contract, together
with all necessary attachments, including assignments and written consents
of the purchasing agent, shall be retained by the purchasing agent in an
appropriate file open to the public for such period of time after termination of
the contract as an action against the county might ensue under applicable
statutes of limitations. After such period, purchase orders, contracts and
attachments may be destroyed by direction of purchasing agent.
Sec, 18-1-9. Responsibility of Bidders — Determination. In determining
the responsibility of any bidder, the commission may take into account other
factors in addition to financial responsibility, such as past records or
transactions with the bidder, experience, adequacy of equipment, ability to
complete performance within a specified time limit and other pertinent considerations.
Sec. 18-1-10. Rejection of Bids. Any and all bids received in response to
an advertisement may be rejected by the board of county commissioners if the
bidder is not deemed responsible, or the character or quality of the services,
supplies, materials, equipment or labor does not conform to requirements, or
if the public interest may otherwise be served thereby.
Sec. 18-1-11. Bonds of Bidders. Bonds with sufficient sureties and in such
amounts as shall be deemed adequate and approved by the board of county
commissioners, not only to insure performance of the contract or purchase
order in the time and manner prescribed, but also to save, indemnify, and
hold the county harmless against losses, damages, claims, liabilities,
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judgments, costs, and expenses which may accrue in consequence of the
granting or the contract or purchase order, shall be required of each bidder on
such contracts and purchase orders as involve amounts in excess of $5,000.00.
$5,000.00.
Sec. 18-1-12. Assignment of Contracts. No contract awarded to the
lowest responsible bidder or to the highest responsible bidder, as the case
may be, shall be assignable by the successful bidder without the written
consent of the board of county commissioners. In no event shall a contract or
any part thereof be assigned to a bidder who is declared not to be a
responsible bidder in the consideration of bids submitted in response to
advertisement of the particular contract or purchase order.
Chapter 2
PURCHASING AGENT
Sections:
18-2-1.
18-2-2.
18-2-3.
18-2-4.
18-2-5.
18-2-6.
18-2-7.

Purchasing Agent — Salary — Bond
Purchasing Agent — Powers and Duties
Revolving Fund
Purchasing Agent — Execution of Contracts
Contracts Executed in Violation of This Ordinance
Local Improvement Projects
Penalty

Sec. 18-2-1. Purchasing Agent — Salary — Bond. The purchasing agent
shall perform or direct the performance of all such duties as are required by
the provisions of this chapter. The salary for the purchasing agent shall bo
fixed by the board of county commissioners which shall, in addition, require
the purchasing agent to post bond with adequate surety in an amount to be
determined by the commission and conditioned upon his faithful performance
of such duties as are here required.
Sec. 18-2-2. Purchasing Agent — Powers And Duties. The purchasing
agent shall:
(1) Recommend adoption, promulgation, and from time to time
revision, of the rules and regulations of the proper conduct of this office;
(2) Constitute the sole agent of the county in contracting for labor,
materials, or services, or for the purchase, lease, or sale of personal property,
materials, equipment or supplies, in conformity with the provisions of this
Title provided, however, that all contracts and purchase orders must be
submitted to the commission for approval and ratification as required by
section 17-5-74, UCA — 1953;
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